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There has been a growing trend to include non-causal models in accounts
of scientific explanation. A worry addressed in this paper is that without
a higher threshold for explanation there are no tools for distinguishing
between models that provide genuine explanations and those that provide
merely potential explanations. To remedy this, a condition is introduced
that extends a veridicality requirement to models that are empirically
underdetermined, highly-idealised, or otherwise non-causal. This condi-
tion is applied to models of electroweak symmetry breaking beyond the
Standard Model.
1 Introduction
Many scientists take themselves to be in the business of searching for and provid-
ing scientific explanations of natural phenomena. What the nature, structure,
and essential features of these scientific explanations are has been a long and
fruitful research tradition in the philosophy of science. It has been proposed that
explanations are certain kinds of deductive arguments from law-like statements
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948), that they capture mechanisms (Machamer
et al., 2000), or latch onto the causal dependency relations in the real world
(Salmon, 1984; Strevens, 2008; Woodward, 2003), and so on. Many of these ap-
proaches have featured prominent roles for some kind of veridicality requirement
on explanation, generally in terms of the truth, or approximate truth, of the
statements or in the representational accuracy of the model being referenced.
Causal accounts of explanation are widely popular and there are many different
approaches to determining the relevant causes, but typically the veridicality re-
quirement is that the dependency relations in the model reflect the actual causes
responsible for the phenomenon to be explained. A major issue for causal ac-
counts is to properly specify which causes are the relevant ones for explaining
their effects.
Recently, however, there has been a growing trend to reflect the varied and
non-veridical practices of scientific modelling. Models are abstract and idealised
and there are many, sometimes conflicting, epistemic aims that guide the model
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builder. That all models of interest in scientific explanation will accurately re-
flect real-world causal relations and that a model will be explanatory precisely
in virtue of the causes in the system are increasingly suspect assumptions. This
has gone hand-in-hand with the acceptance that non-causal models can be ex-
planatory and a broad variety of approaches to explanation have flourished in
the literature as a result. Some have focused on distinctly mathematical ex-
planations (Lange, 2011, 2016), minimal-model explanations (Batterman, 2002;
Batterman and Rice, 2014), structural explanations of highly-idealised mod-
els (Bokulich, 2008, 2011, 2012), non-causal counterfactual explanations (Reut-
linger, 2012, 2016; Saatsi and Pexton, 2013), inferentialist explanations (Khalifa
et al., 2018), and more. I believe that this trend is based on legitimate criticisms
that expose critical shortcomings of causal accounts, but that proponents have
been taking the wrong steps to accommodate non-causal and highly-idealised
models. One of my main worries and the one that will be a focus of this paper
is that in order to accommodate such models, conditions on explanation have
been relaxed to the point that one cannot distinguish between models that pro-
vide genuine explanations and those that provide merely potential or candidate
explanations.
In order to analyse this distinction, I examine some of the potential expla-
nations of mass generation in particle physics.1 The problem is that viable
candidate explanations are not known to be incorrect and so can satisfy local
conditions of empirical adequacy. Instead of what I see as a loosening of re-
quirements for explanation, I argue that a different kind of condition needs to
be imposed—one that focuses on features of the explanation outside of the local
relation between the model and its target system. The idea is to find a global
surrogate for local veridicality conditions. Concretely, this involves requiring
that an explanatory model is part of, or can be fit to, a theory that is highly
confirmed.
In the following section, I introduce this further condition, which I call the
Global Confirmation Condition, and discuss the role of theory in explanation.
In Section 3, I present the case study’s explanandum and review the models
of electroweak symmetry breaking that provide its potential explanations. Fi-
nally, in Section 4, I argue that existing accounts of explanation either cannot
accommodate a Higgs mechanism explanation or cannot distinguish between the
Standard Model (SM) Higgs, which is explanatory, and other models that pro-
vide merely potential, or candidate, explanations. I argue that what makes the
SM Higgs a genuine explanation of particle masses is its place in an empirically
broad and highly-confirmed scientific theory, the SM electroweak theory (EW).
Other symmetry breaking models, extend the SM and propose additional parti-
cle content. Because of this they are called beyond the Standard Model (BSM).
This additional particle content is as yet unconfirmed and indicates that their
associated BSM EW theories are not highly confirmed and thus, the models
1This paper is primarily aimed at scientific explanations in physics. I will make no claims
about explanation in biology or other disciplines. However, I believe a similar exposition to
a variety of case studies in different scientific disciplines could be fruitful for assessing the
condition I introduce, but it is simply outside the scope of this paper.
2
provide merely potential explanations.
2 Theory in Explanation
In most contemporary accounts of explanation, there is no role whatsoever for
theory. Whether or not a model is part of a unifying, highly-confirmed the-
ory with broad empirical scope, is simply not relevant to whether a model or
generalisation is explanatory. Typically, what matters is whether the model
exhibits certain kinds of features shared by the target system, so-called local
features (Wayne, 2017). Contemporary accounts widely considered successful
have focused exclusively on local conditions and have been called common fea-
tures accounts (Batterman and Rice, 2014). These local conditions concern the
relation between the model and its target system, such as the accurate rep-
resentation of causal dependency relations, the ability to support a range of
counterfactuals, and such other features. Throughout the paper, when I say
that a model satisfies local conditions, I mean the following:
Local Counterfactual Condition: an explanatory model M provides
counterfactual information that shows how the explanandum E de-
pends on M and initial, boundary, and auxiliary conditions C.
I formulate the condition in terms of counterfactuals for reasons of generality
and reasons discussed in Section 4.1. These local conditions are contrasted with
global conditions for explanation, which stem from the model’s relation to a
scientific theory. The problem I am addressing in this paper is that existing
accounts require only local conditions, but in many cases this is not sufficient
to distinguish between models that are explanatory and those that offer merely
potential explanations. Let me first address why a global condition would be
relevant to making this distinction.
Hempel’s account of explanation is notoriously fraught with difficulty, but
it featured a role for theory that has been under-emphasised since (Hempel
and Oppenheim, 1948). Theory is important for explanation and for our un-
derstanding; the more we unify facts under theory, the better we understand
them. As Hempel himself says, “what scientific explanation, especially theo-
retical explanation, aims at is... an objective kind of insight that is achieved
by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of
common, underlying structures and processes that conform to specific, testable,
basic principles” (Hempel, 1966, p. 83). Friedman and Kitcher had unification
play a very strong role in explanation, but it is in my esteem only one of the
explanatory benefits of a model’s connection a theory (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher,
1981, 1989). Kitcher’s unificationism is not without its own drawbacks. It may
well be intractable to provide the kind of independent, syntactic account of the
explanatory power of theories that Kitcher was seeking and this is certainly not
the aim here. However, this failure does not imply that we should abandon the
idea that theory is a core aspect of our best scientific explanations.
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A central feature of a good explanation is that it joins the derivation of a new
phenomenon to that which we already understand; it simplifies, organizes, and
relates phenomena and regularities, and so contributes to our understanding of
that phenomenon as well as others. A new explanation presents a new or unex-
plained phenomenon in a similar manner to already understood phenomena, or
in the context of an established body of scientific theory. If a model is capable
of accounting for some target phenomenon, then connecting it with a theory
can broaden and deepen our understanding of an already partially understood
behaviour. Without this broader and deeper understanding that theory can
provide, there is something missing for an explanation.
In the introduction, I claimed that an explanatory model must be ‘part of
or can be fit to’ a highly-confirmed scientific theory. Let me now state this
condition explicitly as follows:
Global Confirmation Condition: an explanatory model M is a part
of, or can be fit to, a highly-confirmed scientific theory T .
As far as I see it, this condition raises three further questions, which I address
in turn:
1. What does it mean to be a part of a theory?
2. What does it mean to be fit to a theory?
3. What does it mean for a theory to be highly confirmed?
1. What it means for a model to be a part of a theory is relatively clear. It
is particularly clear if one shares a syntactic view of theories in the sense of the
logical positivists. For Carnap (1939) and Hempel (1965), a theory was a set of
sentences in an axiomatic system of first order logic, and a model of a theory was
what could be formulated and interpreted within that formal language. There
is a straightforward deductive relation between theories and models. However,
this view is not widely regarded as accurate of scientific theories. Luckily, what
it means for a model to be a part of a theory is also clear on semantic views of
theories, as described in (Giere, 1988; Sneed, 1973; Suppes, 1960; van Fraassen,
1980) and many works since. This view has been a dominant one in recent
decades and it is reflected in the way that I am characterising models and
theories in physics. There are many different semantic views that characterise
the relation differently, but generally models are related by their structure as
mathematical objects. A scientific theory is constituted by a class of models
which can be used to represent phenomena. For a model to be a part of a theory,
it would simply be a member of that collection of models. Some proponents
of the semantic view maintained the syntactic view’s axiomatic treatment of
theories, but cast in mathematical or model-theoretic terms rather than in first-
order logic. I do not require such a strong deductive relation between models
and theories.
2. In the case study introduced in the following section, the model is simply
a part of the theory and we need not worry any further, however, I acknowledge
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that in many cases, the model-theory connection not so clear. We can identify
cases where models are strongly or directly connected with or even a part of
a theory (applying Newton’s second law, solving the ideal gas law, etc.) and
cases where there is no connection to theory (such as a data model or linear
regression model). The most unclear cases are where a model may only be
partially or thinly related with a theory; borrows mathematical tools, modelling
practices, and concepts from multiple theories; or involves idealisations that are
hard to reconcile with the core equations or principles of a theory. It is not
clear at first pass whether such models are explanatory given the condition I
presented above, but I leave it intentionally open in the formulation that it is
possible that models could be made to fit a theory in cases where they are not
obviously a part of it. What I have in mind are cases where the description
of the phenomenon can be prepared in such a way as to be mathematically
amenable to the needs of a theory (in the sense of Cartwright (1983)). How one
determines a model’s membership in a theory and what steps may need to be
taken in order to ‘connect up’ a given model to a theory are very interesting and
important questions. Cases such as these would require detailed studies and I
anticipate that the answers can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, so
I will refrain from making broad statements about these here.
3. I aim to make progress in making a comparison of the key property of a
scientific theory that I take to be analogous to traditional local requirement of
veridicality, the degree of confirmation of the theory. In making a comparative
analysis between the confirmation of theories, I can avoid having to present a
quantitative degree of confirmation, or in making an analysis of the confirma-
tion of a theory in isolation. In our case, and in many cases, it is clear that
one theory is much more highly confirmed than another. In cases where this is
not clear, of course a closer analysis is required to make a judgement. While
difference in the Higgs case is clear enough that a short exhibition will suffice, a
longer and more detailed analysis of the comparative confirmation distinction of
the various Higgs models must be undertaken on another occasion. If one were
to undertake an analysis in isolation of other models, then this would involve
determining how highly confirmed is highly confirmed enough. In which case,
however, the absence of alternative candidate explanations may speak strongly
in favour of what is available. For now, I turn to introduce the explanandum
phenomenon and the models of electroweak symmetry breaking offering poten-
tial explanations.
3 Case Study: Electroweak Symmetry Breaking
Six years after the 2012 discovery of the Higgs boson, there is still a large number
and variety of viable models in particle physics that offer potential explanations
of particle masses via electroweak symmetry breaking. All of these models are,
to some degree, still active research avenues in particle physics, as evidenced in
(Chall et al., 2019). The Standard Model features the simplest implementation
of the Higgs mechanism, which is a single doublet with one fundamental scalar
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particle. This fundamental scalar particle is known as the Higgs boson and is
responsible for generating the masses of the other SM particles. Other BSM
models treat the fundamental scalar as part of an extended Higgs sector, or
have the symmetry breaking role played by a composite, rather than a funda-
mental, scalar. The aim of this section is to show that although the SM is (and
should be) heavily favoured as the explanation of particle masses, accommodat-
ing or singling out this explanation remains a problem for existing philosophical
accounts of scientific explanation.
3.1 Target Explanandum: Particle Masses
Our explanandum stems from the search for an electroweak (EW) theory; a
unified gauge theory of electromagnetic and weak interactions. The reason that
an explanation needed is a problem known as the ‘zero-mass problem’. A locally
gauge invariant theory, which would be renormalizable, requires that the gauge
bosons that mediate the interaction be massless. For quantum electrodynamics,
there is no issue because the photon is massless. However, the weak interaction
was known to be a short-ranged interaction and thus its intermediate vector
bosons must have mass. So, the zero-mass problem begging for an explanation
was how the massless photon and the massive bosons of the weak interaction
can be described by a gauge-symmetric Lagrangian—this is our explanandum.2
There is a great deal more to the history of the development of electroweak
theory than I will cover here. A much more detailed and technical history can
be found in (Borrelli, 2015; Karaca, 2013) and sources therein. It will suffice
here to briefly mention the solution that became the SM Higgs.
In order to account for differences in mass, the symmetry of the Lagrangian
must be broken and one can break the symmetry by simply writing in the mass
terms by hand (as was done in (Glashow, 1961) who introduced a SU(2) × U(1)
EW theory). However, it was known that simply writing in the mass terms
by hand ruins the renormalizability of the theory. In Glashow’s model, the
origins and values of the symmetry-breaking masses themselves were arbitrary
and in need of explanation. The solution of Higgs (1964a,b) and others3 was
to have the mass terms generated by breaking the symmetry of the system
spontaneously via interaction with a scalar field known, which would become
known as the Higgs field. Without the introduction of the scalar field, the
EW theory leads to non-renormalizable divergences and is unable to generate
meaningful numerical predictions.
The potential of the Higgs field has a ‘Mexican hat’ shape (as shown in
Figure 1), which demonstrates some of field’s special properties. The potential
V has an infinite number of states at its lowest energy and Goldstone (1961)
showed that this vacuum degeneracy would result in a massless boson, as against
experimental evidence. Even though the Lagrangian is symmetrical, any par-
2I have here restricted the explanandum to this problem, but similar stories could be told
about the role of the SM Higgs in generating masses of other particles.
3There are many physicist who contributed to the development of the Higgs mechanism




Figure 1: The Higgs potential, V (φ) = µ2φ†φ+ λ(φ†φ)2
ticular vacuum configuration breaks the local gauge symmetry of the system.
Higgs showed that breaking a local gauge symmetry gives rise to mass terms for
vector bosons and for a scalar particle rather than a massless Goldstone boson.4
The Higgs field can break the local symmetry because it has a non-vanishing
vacuum expectation value. At the potential’s lowest energy, there is a non-zero
value for the φ field. When the other particles interact with this heavy field, they
gain masses proportional to the strength of their interactions with the field, such
that light particles interact only weakly with the Higgs, heavy particles interact
more strongly, and particles like the photon and the neutrino, which do not
interact with the Higgs field, remain massless. And so, the Higgs mechanism is
able to account for the spectrum of the masses of the electroweak gauge bosons
within a gauge theory that provides a means to unify the electromagnetic and
weak forces (for more on the derivation of the masses, see (Karaca, 2013) or
(Peskin and Schroeder, 1995) for textbook derivation).
Weinberg (1967)’s incorporation of spontaneous symmetry breaking into
Glashow’s gauge theory is the formulation of EW theory that eventually came
to be the SM EW theory. What is now the SM Higgs has come from this im-
plementation of the simplest Higgs gauge representation. In the SM, the Higgs
mechanism is realised by a scalar doublet field that results in one physical Higgs
boson—this is the model of EWSB I will refer to as the SM Higgs. The following
subsection mentions some of the BSM models that feature more complex EWSB
mechanisms.
3.2 Candidate Explanations
At the end of the day, it is an empirical matter as to which potential explanation,
if any, is the actual reason why particles have masses. However, when it comes
to letting the empirical data decide between competing explanations, we are
4Higgs avoided the problem of the massless boson by showing that the transversely po-
larized vector fields and the longitudinally polarized Goldstone field combine to become the
components of a massive vector field. This was also shown with different emphases by (Englert
and Brout, 1964) and (Guralnik et al., 1964) who are often also credited as the co-discovers
of the mass-generation mechanism.
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currently at a bit of an impasse. Because of all the data from the LHC, we do
know that there is a SM-like Higgs boson at 125GeV that is CP-even and neutral.
We know that the particle has the non-universal couplings that one expects of
SM Higgs5, and despite record breaking amount of data-taking at the LHC,
there are no significant deviations from SM expectations (ATLAS and CMS
Collaborations, 2015). Many models of EWSB are being squeezed out of the
remaining parameter space, some fairly strongly (e.g. see (Bechtle et al., 2016)).
As is well known from arguments against falsificationism, the data will never
completely rule out these possibilities. Further, any convincing or significant
restrictions on some of the potential explanations at high energies may be a
long time coming. Even by the end of its final run around 2035, the LHC’s
most sensitive searches will leave blind spots for BSM physics in the EWSB
sector. We cannot conclusively say which structures of candidate explanations
are actually present and which are not. This is what leads us to the recent state
of particle physics with many distinct and viable models providing potential
explanations of the various masses of the fundamental particles.
We can divide many EWSB models into different categories based on their
method of breaking the symmetry.6
1. Higgs mechanism
(a) SM Higgs
(b) Extended Higgs sector
(c) Supersymmetrically-extended Higgs sector
2. Dynamical symmetry breaking
(a) Technicolor
(b) Composite Higgs
3. Other (incl. extra-dimensions)
Models that feature the Higgs mechanism have the symmetry broken by the
vacuum expectation value of a fundamental scalar particle, just as I described
above. The SM Higgs boson is a component of a single doublet, whereas in ex-
tended Higgs sector models, the boson of EWSB is an element of larger sector,
which may have two doublets, or a doublet and a singlet, and so on. Supersym-
metric models require at least an additional doublet, and so are special cases of
extended Higgs sectors where the particles are part of a larger symmetry group
such that there are partners for all the other SM particles in addition to the
extra Higgs particles. In a dynamical symmetry breaking account of masses,
the analogy to superconductivity, from which Higgs and others drew insight, is
5The boson couples to different SM particles with different strengths, resulting in their
different masses. All other particles couple universally, i.e. with the same strength.
6These categories are not exclusive or exhaustive, but capture a wide range of popular
models. Similar breakdowns are presented in (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner, 2013; Chall et al., 2019;
Sto¨ltzner, 2017).
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complete. In BCS superconductivity, the symmetry is dynamically broken by a
bound state of electrons, called a Cooper pair. Analogously, in the Higgs sector,
the symmetry would be broken by a bound state of new heavy particles. So,
instead of having a fundamental scalar to restore perturbative unitarity above
the TeV scale, a new strong dynamics kicks in and instead of a light resonance,
there is a tower of heavy resonances. While technicolor is widely considered
dead, composite Higgs models are still pursued. Lastly, there are also EWSB
models where the symmetry is broken by an appropriate choice of boundary
conditions in higher dimensions.7.
What is important in this discussion is that even though models like com-
posite Higgs can also account for particle masses, we are not justified in claiming
that a composite Higgs is the reason why particles have mass. Composite Higgs
models may be (highly) disfavoured, but are not completely ruled out and so
are at least potentially explanatory. As such, they represent exactly the kind
of model we should not claim is explanatory. What all these various models
offer are potential, or candidate explanations, which could be tested and pro-
moted to genuine explanations by further research. This is not an unusual case,
but typical of situations that often arise at the frontier of scientific research.
For instance, several different models have been proposed to explain the Sun’s
anomalous coronal heating, cosmic inflation, the rotation curves of galaxies,
and so on. These various models are all more or less equivalently empirically
adequate and thus existing accounts of explanation would lack the tools to dis-
tinguish among them. While this paper only focuses on one case study, it is
not an exceptional case, but a rather common state of affairs to have two or
more viable potential explanations of some phenomenon. This situation indi-
cates that a higher threshold for explanation is required and that is precisely
what the condition I introduce provides. The fact that the models are under-
determined by local conditions, strongly indicates that one should look outside
the model-phenomenon relation for a stronger condition.
Supersymmetry is often cited in physics papers as providing explanations of
inflation, thermal relic abundance, the low Higgs mass, the weak hierarchy, and
other outstanding issues of the SM. If supersymmetry is found to obtain, then
it will be capable of explaining a lot of internal and external deficiencies of the
SM—one could say that it has a great deal of explanatory promise. Though it is
often claimed that such underdetermined/undiscovered models ‘explain’ some
phenomenon, what must be meant is that they offer potential explanations.
Otherwise, the claim that a model explains a phenomenon would be tantamount
to saying that it can accommodate that phenomenon or is not incompatible
with it. More than that has always been meant by ‘explanation’ in philosophy.
Perhaps one can understand the claim as saying that the model would explain if
it actually obtained. However, a model that would explain if it did obtain, does
not explain in virtue of that fact alone, because this is true of every model. To
give an explanation is to show the reason why—to show what may potentially
be the reason why is only to give a potential explanation.
7For more on these groups of EWSB models see (Borrelli, 2012; Chall et al., 2019)
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4 Analysis
4.1 Applying Accounts of Explanation
It is not possible in this section to review all of the various kinds of explanations
and apply them to this case with an amount of detail that would convince their
proponents. However, I wish to make two claims here. The first claim is that it is
far from trivial to classify the Higgs mechanism as explanatory on many accounts
of explanation. In particular, it is far from obvious that the Higgs mechanism,
despite its name, is a real mechanism, or that it exhibits the right kinds of
causal dependency relations that would make it causally explanatory. The Higgs
mechanism is not a system of entities that exhibits push-pull dynamics. But
a mechanism is often considered more broadly than this. Machamer et al.
(2000) have argued that a mechanism can be “entities and activities organized
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish
or termination conditions” (p. 3). If the Higgs were to fit this description,
it would be an organised system that changes massless particles into massive
ones. But that is simply not the case. We need a more minimal notion of
what a mechanism is. Glennan (2017) has given us such a picture and he has
described a ‘minimal mechanism’ as consisting “of entities (or parts) whose
activities and interactions are organized in such a way that they produce the
phenomenon” (p. 13). Even in a minimal and inclusive sense, a mechanism must
have interacting parts and must involve a temporal and regular production of
the phenomenon. Unlike in the Higgs-inspirational case of superconductivity,
there is no underlying dynamics and no phase transition. In fact, as has been
recently argued by Fraser and Koberinski (2016), the Higgs mechanism is no
temporal process at all; the Higgs field is just there and so are the particle
masses.
The lack of interactions and temporal order indicate that the Higgs mecha-
nism is unlikely to be captured by causal accounts. Causal accounts of expla-
nation gained a lot of popularity because the asymmetry that causal relations
import was an obvious and effective solution to some of the major problems
that plagued the D-N account of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948;
Salmon, 1989). In recent causal accounts of explanation, such as Woodward
(2003), there is a shift away from causal interactions and processes. For Wood-
ward, explanatory knowledge comes from counterfactual information about how
to manipulate physical systems and learn about the causal structure of the
world. He explicates his notion of causation in terms of directed graphs, fol-
lowing (Spirtes et al., 1993) and (Pearl, 2000). One can determine whether X
causes Y , by performing interventions I on X, under the certain conditions that
isolate and test the effect that changing the value of the X has on the values of
Y . X causes Y if the system is invariant under a range of these interventions.
In our case, how can one represent the Higgs mechanism as a directed graph?
Perhaps, we could think of Y as the masses of the EW gauge bosons and X
as the vacuum expectation value. This would mean that all the models have
the same X. What is of more interest is the various mechanisms of the candi-
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date explanations from which the scalar field results. X, or rather X1, . . . , Xn,
should be the values of the all the parameters involved in the various EWSB
models that lead to a vacuum expectation value that can generate the particle
masses. Not only might this be intractable to set up as a directed graph, these
are merely models and not physical systems on which one can intervene—it is
not clear that there is even an I that causes X. One can relax the literal inter-
pretation of ‘manipulation’ in Woodward’s account, as many are inclined, but
it is a stretch to include hypothetically adjusting parameters on particles that
may or may not exist. Perhaps one can accommodate the Higgs mechanism
into this framework, but this would require a very loose notion of causes and
causal interventions. I think it is widely recognised that the prospects for a
causal interpretation of the Higgs mechanism are rather slim, and that a more
general framework for explanation would be better suited. Some, such as Reut-
linger (2012) and Saatsi and Pexton (2013), have argued for a turn away from
Woodward’s causal interventions to get a general account of counterfactual ex-
planation. My worry here is that while counterfactual accounts provide a broad
and inclusive framework for explanation, there is no way to debar claims that,
for instance, a composite Higgs explains why particles have masses.
This brings us to my second claim, which is that according to accounts where
the Higgs mechanism could be accommodated (counterfactual accounts), there
are no grounds to prefer it over merely candidate explanations. On Reutlinger’s
account, an explanation satisfies the following three conditions: (i) veridicality,
(ii) implication, and (iii)dependence (Reutlinger, 2016, p. 737). (i) Veridical-
ity requires that the set of generalisations G1, . . . , Gm, auxiliary assumptions
S1, . . . , Sn,, and explanandum statement E are all (approximately) true. This
condition sounds straightforward to assess, however, we are comparing viable,
empirically adequate models and the statements of their various explanans are
not known to be false—they are compatible with all observed data. In this sense,
they could be could be understood as being approximately true. Now, it may
turn out that, in a stricter sense, the generalisations involved in these explana-
tions featuring composite or heavy Higgses are not even approximately true (if
in reality there just are no such things), but at this point we simply do not know.
Insofar as we can make determinations about the truth or approximate truth
of such models, it seems that either our viable models are approximately true,
or we don’t know if they are. Cases like these BSM models arise specifically
because the differentiating aspects of the models are underdetermined.8 (ii) The
implication condition requires that the explanans (generalisations and auxiliary
assumptions) logically entails the explanandum E or some conditional proba-
bility P (E|S1, . . . , Sn), which need not be high. Given that the predictions for
ranges of particle masses follows formally in the models, this condition should
be trivially satisfied by the various models we are considering. (iii) Lastly, the
dependence condition states that if S had been different, E or the conditional
probability would also have been different. These models are mathematically
8This is precisely where I see the confirmation condition stepping in as an analogue for a
veridicality condition as it allows us to make distinctions in such cases.
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robust physics models and the effects of changes in the values of parameters
can be calculated to see what would be observed. Again, one cannot actually
intervene and change the Higgs VEV or its couplings and see what actually
happens. While one can only get formal results within the model, this ought
to be sufficient on a non-causal account to indicate what would have happened
had certain values or initial conditions been different.
The important result from applying these conditions is that other viable
BSM models satisfy them just as well as the SM Higgs. The other candidate
explanations are capable of accommodating a 125 GeV SM-like Higgs boson,
and so they satisfy the veridicality condition as far as we can determine it.
The values of the parameters of the models entail the observed values in the
explanandum, to various degrees of specificity and adjusting the parameters of
the models leads to differences that would be observed in the explanandum (or
so the results of the model indicate). There are no tools available to this account
that are capable of distinguishing between SM Higgs and various BSM models.
However, as a counterfactual account is a general framework for explanation
that could be broad enough to accommodate a Higgs mechanism explanation,
I will here take this to form the local condition on explanation, which I formu-
lated above (Section 2). Although, I believe that such a counterfactual condition
would be trivially satisfied by any reasonable scientific model, this is not some-
thing I will argue here. Instead, I take the satisfaction of this condition as a basic
requirement of a scientific explanation, viz. the reproduction of the explanan-
dum and the provision of information about the model’s dependency relations.
I will take satisfaction of this condition as sufficient for determining a candidate
or potential explanation. In the following section, I turn to the Global Con-
firmation Condition to distinguish genuine, highly-justified explanations from
merely potential explanations by looking outside the derivation of explanandum
from explanans, i.e. beyond the satisfaction of the local conditions.
4.2 Confirmation Comparison
The problem I have outlined so far is that existing accounts that can accom-
modate a Higgs mechanism explanation have no tools to distinguish between
models that we ought to consider explanatory (SM Higgs) and models that
merely offer potential explanations (MSSM or Composite Higgs). This is be-
cause these potentially explanatory models can satisfy any local conditions of
veridicality (between the model and the target system) as far as they can be
presently determined. My proposed solution is that a further global condition
(between model and theory) is required. In order to see how this global condi-
tion works, we compare the confirmation of the theories that the models belong
to. In the remainder of the section, I first make a compelling case that the
SM Higgs is explanatory because it satisfies the global condition, and second,
I argue that other symmetry breaking models are only potentially explanatory
because they fail to satisfy the same condition. I will focus on the two-Higgs
doublet model (2HDM), but the argument would proceed identically for any
BSM model, because they all predict additional unconfirmed particle content,
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and it is on this that the argument hinges.
So, to proceed with the analysis, why does the SM Higgs explain particle
masses? First, the model can satisfy local conditions about the explanandum,
since it gives a wide range of counterfactual information about possible changes
to the system. The SM Higgs boson has precise properties that have been
calculated as a function of its mass and no significant deviation from these
predictions has been observed. The SM is a quantum field theory with a robust
mathematical foundation and easily allows for quantitative assessments of what
would have been the case, or what would have been observed, had things been
different, such as had the particle had a different mass, a different spin, or
coupled with different strengths to various other particles.
Importantly, it also satisfies the confirmation condition as the SM Higgs is
also a part of a highly-confirmed scientific theory, in this case the SM electroweak
theory. SM EW theory is so strongly confirmed at present that the particle is
assumed to be exactly SM-like and incorporated into the background in the
search for new physics (Ellis, 2017). My claim is that it is the embedding of
the Higgs into a theory, and that theory’s subsequent successes that distinguish
it from the other candidate explanations. One can see that this is the case
because Higgs’ proposal was not explanatory until the EW theory it is a part
of was highly-confirmed.
At the time of the Higgs mechanism papers in 1964, there was no explana-
tion of particle masses. There was at best a candidate explanation—a way of
potentially solving the zero-mass problem. However, as the EW theory became
increasingly confirmed, the more justified we became in thinking that the SM
Higgs mechanism explained particle masses. In 1967, Weinberg incorporated
the Higgs mechanism into a SU(2) × U(1) gauge theory of leptons, building
off of work by Glashow (Glashow, 1961; Weinberg, 1967).9 Even at this time,
significant doubts were expressed about the prospects of the theory. Weinberg
himself says: “of course our model has too many arbitrary features for these
predictions to be taken very seriously” (1967, p. 1265). As the Lagrangian was
gauge invariant, it was suspected that the EW theory was renormalizable, but
this had not rigorously demonstrated. A proof of the renormalizability of the
model would ultimately come from ’t Hooft (1971), only after which the theory
gained the interest of the community (Galison, 1988, p. 157). Renormalizability
was key because without the inclusion of the Higgs field, the EW theory could
not be used to make precise predictions of the particles’ masses as the calcula-
tions led to divergences. It was properly only after this point that SM Higgs
became a viable candidate for an explanation of the variance in masses of the
electroweak particles.
There are several notable milestones in the history of the SM EW theory
that contributed to its confirmation and would lead to its becoming genuinely
explanatory. The SM EW theory (complete with SM Higgs) was used to pre-
dict neutral currents in 1972, which were then observed in 1973 (Karaca, 2013).
Subsequently, the massive gauge bosons that were predicted by the theory, the
9For a more detailed history of subsequent development of the model, see (Borrelli, 2015).
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W± and Z0, were discovered in 1982–3 with the masses predicted. During this
time and in the years since, other candidate explanations were proposed. These
alternatives accounted for known observables, but predicted deviations from the
SM and predicted new particles, which were not observed in the precision mea-
surements at LEP in the 90s. Thus, even before the Higgs boson discovery, the
SM Higgs was among only a few viable alternatives and as the minimal, simplest,
and most austere, was (and remains) the most highly-confirmed implementa-
tion of the symmetry breaking mechanism. The main alternatives, composite
Higgs and supersymmetry, were strongly favoured by many physicists, but not
for the degree to which they had already been confirmed. Their popularity
stemmed from their explanatory promise in making up for some of the SM’s
shortcomings, like offering dark matter candidates and having a naturally low
Higgs boson mass.
By far the biggest jump in the justification of explanatory claims about the
SM Higgs came with the 2012 discovery and has only been increasing since. As
more and more data is analysed, the evidence fails to indicate any significant
deviations from the SM Higgs predictions, and further, the energies being probed
by the LHC are making the additional new physics of alternative proposals less
likely to be found in the near future. Since 2012, with the discovery of the
Higgs boson, the SM EW theory has become very highly confirmed and we are
strongly justified in claiming that SM Higgs explains particle masses.
Now consider by contrast, an other model of electroweak symmetry breaking,
the two-Higgs doublet (2HDM) and its associated theory. I consider this model
as it is the most minimal extension of the Higgs sector. At first glance, it looks
as though the theory it is a part of should also be the SM, just like in the case
above. After all, the SM is modular and its ‘sectors’ are largely independent.
One can substitute in a more complicated Higgs sector and leave the rest of the
SM the same. However, a different EWSB sector indicates a different theory. A
two-Higgs doublet together with the rest of the SM, would not be the SM, but
some SM’. These are the theories we should compare: the SM EW theory and
the 2HDM EW theory.10
An extended 2HDM model may be a part of some EW theory, but that the-
ory is not well confirmed. The 2HDM predicts five physical Higgs boson, but no
hints of the 4 additional bosons have been observed at the LHC. As mentioned
above, versions of the 2HDM with minimal or constrained minimal supersym-
metry (MSSM) have been strongly ruled out. The only aspects of these models
that are well-confirmed are the SM aspects. What I have argued elsewhere is
that because MSSM shares particle content with the SM (as every viable BSM
model does), but none of the additional particles have been confirmed, it will
always be less well or less thoroughly confirmed than the SM.
This argument is even clearer for other models of EWSB where there are
many more particles, processes, and larger deviations predicted, which are more
strongly disconfirmed by data. Even in so-called minimal supersymmetry, there
10While I think it is more accurate to compare the EW theories, the same conclusion should
follow comparing the SM and some SM’.
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are 105 additional parameters and it introduces more new particles than there
are already in the SM. All of these additional unconfirmed predictions de-
tract from theory’s confirmation—the more new particles a theory predicts,
the smaller fraction of its predictions have been confirmed. Even though BSM
models can account for the explanandum—they can predict the various masses
of the EW particles—they do not explain the explanandum, because the the-
ories of which they are a part lack empirical confirmation. This difference in
confirmation provides an empirical justification for the claim that the SM Higgs
explains the various masses of EW gauge bosons, even though competing models
satisfy local dependency conditions.
5 Conclusion
I have introduced a global confirmation condition on explanation that ensures
that an explanatory model is part of, or can be fit to, a highly-confirmed scien-
tific theory. This condition provides a way of maintaining a kind of veridicality
requirement for explanation that works when competing models are underde-
termined. It does not, however, only work in this context, but would provide a
means of maintaining veridicality for models that cannot be properly assessed
by their representative accuracy, such as highly-idealised models and non-causal
models in general. Because the emphasis is not on the common features that
a model shares with its target system it is well-suited to capture a variety of
idealised and highly-idealised explanatory models.
The condition I have presented is somewhat conservative in that only well-
established models can be genuinely explanatory, but I have also articulated the
notion of a candidate explanation and recognise the importance of pursuing and
developing these. The SM and BSM models play different roles in explanation
in particle physics. BSM models are attempts to explain the as-yet-unexplained
in particle physics—they have been developed in the pursuit of further expla-
nations. And so, as Sto¨ltzner (2017) shows, the SM is both explanans and
explanandum. A physicist can use the Higgs potential in an explanation of
masses, but also pursue some BSM models that offer candidate explanations of
why the Higgs potential has its characteristic shape. Explanations in particle
physics have certainly not bottomed out at the SM—as anyone with children
knows: there are always more why-questions. This is not challenged by my
claim that the SM Higgs provides a genuine explanation but a BSM model does
not—at least, not yet.
In this paper, I have argued that looking outside of the model-phenomenon
relation—beyond the local conditions—can provide a means to implement a
veridicality analogue for underdetermined (and highly-idealised) models. I have
presented a condition that maintains a high threshold for explanation, whose
aim is not to debar pseudo-scientific models or those which are known to be
inaccurate or false, but to distinguish competing, viable explanations. This
is not something that is widely attempted, and I think, to the detriment of
the literature. An account of explanation with a high-threshold condition can
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provide an important valuation of potentially explanatory models—something
that I take to be a worthy goal of the philosophy of science.
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